Since oil prices fell in 2014, global producers have found themselves at a crossroads: should they help to balance the oil market by voluntarily limiting production, or continue to compete for market share, taking advantage of the exit of producers with high production costs? A number of countries, including both members and non-members of OPEC, have chosen the first option, and, as a result of voluntary limits on production, have succeeded in temporarily stabilizing prices. Other countries, which again include both members and non-members of OPEC, have taken advantage of the situation to expand into markets that are now less populated. Market unease is being contributed to by growing competition in the use of new production technologies and in energy consumption, which in the long term could significantly alter the energy balance and the configuration of the oil market.
What are the strategic consequences of tactics chosen in the face of the oil market surplus? What influence is oil market competition having on the spread of alternative energy sources and technologies; in particular, electric vehicles? What mechanisms for regulating the oil market cartel agreements, sanctions, or international cooperation demonstrate the greatest potential? What approach should oil market participants adhere to in order to make maximum use of their existing competitive advantages in production costs, geography, or infrastructure? Which is more important in the long term the market or prices?